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A Stochastic Model * 
Gary King, Haward  University 
This paper builds a stochastic model of  the processes that give rise to observed patterns  of 
representation and bias in congressional and state legislative elections. The analysis demonstrates 
that partisan swing and incumbency voting, concepts from the congressional elections literature, have 
determinate effects on representation and bias, concepts from the redistrictihg literature. The model 
shows precisely how incumbency and increased variability of partisan swing reduce the responsive- 
ness of the electoral system and how partisan swing affects whether the system is biased toward one 
party or the other.  Incumbency, and other causes of  unresponsive representation,  also reduce the 
effect of partisan swing on current levels of partisan bias. 
By  relaxing the restrictive portions of  the widely applied "uniform  partisan swing"  assump- 
tion,  the theoretical  analysis  leads directly to an  empirical  model enabling  one  more reliably  to 
estimate responsiveness and bias from a single year of  electoral data. Applying this to data from 
seven elections in each of six states, the paper demonstrates that redistricting has effects in predicted 
directions in the short run: partisan gerrymandering biases the system in favor of the party in control 
and, by freeing up seats held by opposition party incumbents, increases the system's responsiveness. 
Bipartisan-controlled redistricting appears to reduce bias somewhat and dramatically to reduce re- 
sponsiveness. Nonpartisan redistricting  processes  substantially increase responsiveness  but do not 
have as clear an effect on bias. However, after only two elections, prima facie evidence for redistrict- 
ing  effects evaporate in  most states. Finally,  across every state and type of  redistricting  process, 
responsiveness declined significantly over the course of  the decade. This is clear evidence that the 
phenomenon of  "vanishing marginals,"  recognized first in the U.S. Congress literature, also applies 
to these different types of state legislative assemblies. It also strongly suggests that redistricting could 
not account for this pattern. 
1. Introduction 
Representative  democracies generally  group citizens  into legislative  con- 
stituencies.  Individuals  living  throughout  each  state  are  geographically  seg- 
mented  into legislative districts;  this, in turn, creates  a particular  set of  voter 
preferences within each district and hence a specific statewide allocation of leg- 
islative seats to each political party. In the United States, congressional and state 
legislative district lines are redrawn  approximately  every decade. This creates 
new opportunities for partisan  gerrymanderers to seek to gain political advan- 
tage, incumbents to insulate themselves from electoral swings, and the courts to 
impose a system of "fair"  representation. 
*Thanks to Chris Achen,  Jim Alt,  Neal Beck, Bruce Cain, Andrew Gelman, and Elizabeth 
Rosenthal for many helpful discussions and comments. Robert Browning also made significant con- 
tributions  at  an  early  stage in this research. Thanks  also to the National  Science Foundation for 
research support grants SES-87-22715 and SES-89-09201. 
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Although the allocation of an individual legislative seat to a political party 
within  each  district  depends  deterministically  and  unambiguously  on  citizen 
votes through the winner-take-all rule, the basic character of the state's electoral 
system is defined  only  at the statewide  level  by  aggregating  these individual 
districts.  For  example, gerrymandering is never  a problem when considering 
only a single district, since the winner-take-all rule still treats both parties fairly; 
however, the aggregation of these districts, in combination with the geographic 
distribution of partisans and the configuration of district lines, produces a "sto- 
chastid'  (probabilistic) relationship  between  the statewide division  of  votes  a 
party reciives and the aggregate allocation of seats among the parties. 
The redistricting process also influences the form of democratic represen- 
tation and the degree and direction of partisan bias-concepts  that are inherently 
defined only on the level of the political system. Many scholars have analyzed 
the effects of redistricting (e.g., Grofman and Lijphart  1986; Cain 1984; Grof- 
man et al.  1982; Polsby  1971), but few have incorporated in their models the 
dynamic features of elections, such as incumbency and partisan swing.' 
In this paper I first extend the aggregate theory of representation  in King 
and Browning (1987) to include cases where the allocation of legislative seats is 
relatively  unresponsive to citizen votes. This extension unifies the literature on 
redistricting with recent empirical findings that U.S. congressional elections are 
becoming less competitive (e.g., Mayhew  1971, 1974; Ferejohn  1977; Fiorina 
1977; Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1988). In the core of this paper, I then 
develop a district-level theoretical model of the process by which partisan elec- 
toral swings and incumbency voting modify democratic representation and par- 
tisan bias. Using this model and an empirical estimation of it, I analyze the more 
basic phenomena that give rise to the extant aggregate patterns of representation 
and bias,  first described by Tufte (1973). In total, this analysis formally links 
the concepts of representation  and partisan  bias from the seats-votes  literature 
with factors such as incumbency and partisan swing from the congressional elec- 
tions literature-two  substantively related fields with too few cross-citations and 
even fewer unified models. It generalizes and relaxes the widely used, but quite 
restrictive  and often  unrealistic,  "uniform  partisan  swing"  assumption  intro- 
duced almost four decades ago by Butler (1951). The paper modifies the essen- 
tially "static"  seats-votes models in the literature to include dynamic change and 
to provide reliable estimates of bias and representation  with data from only a 
'Previous court decisions have constrained the redistricting process only slightly by  requiring 
that every district contain equal numbers of citizens, that districts be contiguous,  and that the redis- 
tricting not  dilute minority  voting strength. However, beyond these judicial  requirements  and the 
winner-take-all rule within each single-member district, the state imposes no constitutional or statu- 
tory rule constraining the relationship between the statewide proportion of votes a party receives and 
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single election. It also demonstrates the value of stochastic modeling for political 
science research. 
2.  Conceptualizing Representation and Bias: The Seats-Votes Curve 
This section reviews and extends the basic concepts of representation  and 
bias, defined at the statewide level in an idealized two-party electoral system. I 
use the names "Democratic"  and "Republican"  for these two parties and refer 
explicitly to state legislative elections, but the model presented here applies in 
principle to any two-party system with single-member electoral districts.  In the 
section after this, I derive a district-level model that demonstrates what gives rise 
to these statewide relationships. 
Following King and Browning (1987), I define an unbiased electoral system 
as partisan symmetry in the seats-votes relationship: in a two-party system, the 
absence of bias is the situation where each political party is allocated the same 
proportion of seats for an equivalent proportion of votese3  A two-party electoral 
system with partisan bias is asymmetric in that it enables one of  the political 
parties to receive more seats for a given proportion of votes than the opposition 
party would re~eive.~ 
Note that  partisan  symmetry does not  necessarily  imply de facto propor- 
tional representation, where the proportion of statewide Democratic votes trans- 
lates  into the  same proportion  of  statewide  Democratic  seats.  Indeed,  many 
forms of fair representation can exist. For example, the first column of Figure 1 
gives six examples of fair electoral systems (please ignore the second column of 
the figure for the moment). Each of these examples has the proportion of state- 
wide Democratic votes across the horizontal axis (marked as E(V)) and the pro- 
portion Democratic seats on the vertical axis (marked as E(S)). Each graph in 
this column of  Figure 1 represents  an electoral system that is symmetric with 
respect to the par tie^.^ For example, in the fourth graph (labeled p  = 3), con- 
sider an election where the Democrats received 60% of the vote. To determine 
the allocation of legislative seats, move from E(V) = 0.6 vertically to the curve 
and then horizontally to the Y axis; in this case, if the Democrats received 60% 
2Although I address other types of distortion, the only type of bias the model here includes is 
partisan. The most significant omission caused by this focus is the exclusion of racial gerrymandering 
as a possible longer lasting effect on the electoral system. 
'See Grofman (1983) for alternative definitions of partisan bias. 
41n any one election, each party actually receives only a single fixed proportion of votes and 
seats, but  in  theory  this particular  election  is  an  outcome  from the  set of  all possible  outcomes 
generated by the same underlying electoral system. This underlying electoral system, more than any 
one particular election, is the focus of this study. 
5An  easy way to check for symmetry is to change the axes from proportion Democratic seats 
and votes to proportion  Republican seats and votes.  If  the  interpretation remains  unchanged,  the 
system is symmetric with respect to the parties and hence unbiased. FIGURE 1 
Forms of Fair Representation (A  = 0) 
Seats-Votes Curves  Mean Voter Preference Distributions FIGURE  1  (cont.) 
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of the vote, they are allocated 77% of the legislative seats on average. This is 
not proportional, but it is still fair, since if the Republicans were to receive 60% 
of the vote (1 - E(V) = 0.6), they too would be allocated 77% (1 - E(S) = 
0.77) of the seats. 
In addition to being symmetric, all six figures pass through three points: 0, 
0; 0.5, 0.5, and 1, 1. The curves must pass through the endpoints, since if one 
party receives every vote statewide, only election fraud would keep it from tak- 
ing all the seats. In  addition, all fair curves must pass through  the midpoint, 
since this is the point around which they are symmetric. 
However, even with these constraints, one can imagine a large number of 
different,  fair seats-votes curves. The six in the first column of  Figure  1 are 
arranged  according  to the form of  democratic  representation,  indexed by  the 
parameter p . At one extreme of fair representation are electoral systems that are 
unresponsive (0 <  p < I), with the proportion of seats for a party reacting only 
sluggishly to even large changes in votes for that party. This pattern can be seen 
in the two seats-votes curves that are relatively flat over most of their range in 
the first column of Figure 1 (p = 0.15 and p = 0.50). Across all the figures, as 
p  gets larger, the center of the seats-votes curves become steeper; that  is, the 
proportion of seats allocated between the parties is more sensitive to changes in 
voter preferences in this range. A logical midpoint is proportional representation 
(p =  l), where  S  =  V and the legislature  rejects the  distribution  of  voter 
preferences as faithfully as possible. 
Some degree of reflection in representation is clearly important in two-party 
democratic electoral systems, but virtually all electoral systems give a bonus in 
seats to the majority party (Rae 1971). In the present idealized two-party model, 
this tendency is called a "majoritarian"  electoral system (and is modeled with 
1 < p < m). This type of system may foster governability,  since the majority 
party is allocated a higher proportion of seats than the votes it receives, and one 
might also argue that such systems enhance competitiveness and minority rep- 
resentation,  since the majority party  advantage in the seats-votes relationship 
gets progressively smaller as the majority gets larger (see the two relatively steep 
and  hence  responsive  curves in Figure  1 for p  = 3 and p  =  8). However, 
governability has other sources, and majoritarian  electoral systems have other 
consequences  (see Lijphart  1984, chap.  7). Winner-take-all  electoral  systems 
(with p =  m), where a party with only slightly greater than half the vote receives 
all the seats statewide, fall at the other extreme. Here, responsiveness is maxi- 
mized at the cost of minority representation and electoral reflection. 
Representation  thus  spans  unresponsive  (0  < p  <  l),  proportional 
(p =  I), majoritarian (1 < p < a), and  winner-take-all (p =  m)  electoral 
systems. By including unresponsive representation  on the same continuum, in 
this way, this presentation thus significantly expands the notion of representation 
in King and Browning (1987). Note that since these seats-votes curves are sym- REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE  REDISTRICTING  793 
metric with  respect to the parties, they all model different types of  unbiased 
electoral systems. 
These curves depict some of the many possible state-level electoral systems 
existing under geographically contiguous single-member districts. They are not 
drawn on the basis of  any data, and none of  these forms of representation are 
required by  law.  The specific model used  to draw these figures is  the bilogit 
functional form,  introduced by  King and  Browning (1987). Under the bilogit 
form,  and  most  other forms proposed for the relationship between  seats and 
votes,  the expected proportion of  statewide Democratic seats is  a function of 
statewide Democratic votes and some parameters: 
E(S) = f(V, Parameters)  (1) 
In  a familiar special case, this form f(.) is linear and the parameters are the 
intercept (a)  and slope (P)  coefficients (see Tufte 1973; Schrodt 1981): 
However, a linear form is implausible, since expected seats could go below zero 
or above one, is not constrained to pass through the 0, 0 and 1, 1 points (which 
we  know  for certain), and  for  several other reasons described by  King  and 
Browning (1987). 
I therefore turn to the full bilogit form: 
-  1 
E(S) = {  1 + exp [  -1 -  pln (+v)]} 
This special case of  equation 1 may  appear more complicated than the linear 
special case in equation 2, but it is nearly as simple to use, has the same number 
of parameters, and is more theoretically appropriate. In the bilogit equation, the 
two parameters have distinct meanings: A  is the partisan bias ~arameter.~  The 
equality A  = 0 indicates an unbiased system; A > 0 refers to an electoral system 
that favors the Democrats, and A < 0 favors the Republicans. The parameter p 
indexes the form of  democratic representation. Once  A,  p, and  V are set to 
specific numbers, the right-hand side of equation 3 reduces to a single number, 
the expected proportion of  Democratic seats.  Each of  the graphs in  the first 
column of  Figure  1 was drawn by  setting  A  = 0, to indicate the absence of 
partisan bias, setting p at a value associated with a particular graph, and substi- 
tuting in a range of values of  V between zero and one. 
When the electoral system is biased toward one party or the other, this range 
of  representational forms is  not reduced, since representation and bias exist on 
separate dimensions and are modeled with distinct parameters. Instead, partisan 
bias  appears in  this model as asymmetry in  the seats-votes curve-deviations 
The  parameter A in this article is equivalent to In@) from King and Browning (1987). FIGURE 2 
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from a particular form of (symmetric) representation. The first column of Figure 
2 redraws each of  the curves from the  first column of  Figure  1 with  A  =  1 
indicating bias favoring the Democratic party (please ignore the second column 
of both figures until the next section). For each, note how the Democrats would 
receive more seats for a given proportion of votes than the Republicans would 
be allocated if they had gotten the same proportion of votes. 
Although partisan bias is introduced as a deviation from partisan symmetry, 
even biased  seats-votes curves pass through the 0, 0 and 1, 1 points.  Except in 
cases of voter fraud, district-level results that are uniformly 0% Democratic (ar 
Republican) aggregate deterministically to the statewide level. For all other pat- 
terns  of  district-level  results,  the  aggregation  process  produces  a  stochastic 
relationship. 
3.  From Voter Preferences to the Seats-Votes Curve 
The bilogit form was used by King and Browning  (1987) to estimate the 
partisan bias A  and representation p parameters with data from many elections. 
The basic idea was to plot statewide seat proportions by statewide vote propor- 
tions, with each point on the plot representing a single election. One then fit the 
bilogit form to these points to estimate p and A. This approach is useful for some 
purposes, but not for tracking changes in the parameters over time to assess the 
effects of redistricting or other factors. 
In order to study short-term changes in p and A both theoretically and em- 
pirically, a district-level model is necessary. By far the most common model of 
this sort is called uniform partisan swing; I describe this model and its relatively 
unrealistic assumptions in the first subsection. Following that, I derive a more 
sophisticated stochastic district-level model in the second subsection and intro- 
duce a much more general assumption for deriving the seats-votes curve in the 
final subsection. 
The Uniform Partisan Swing Model 
In  order to derive a seats-votes  curve from district-level  electoral votes, 
some assumption needs to be made. The most widely used  assumption  in the 
literature is called "uniform  partisan  swing"  and was introduced by Butler in 
1951 (for recent applications,  see Niemi and Deegan  1978, Gudgin and Taylor 
1979, Niemi  1985, Niemi and Fett 1986, and many others). The assumption is 
that vote proportions in every district all move in lockstep, swinging back and 
forth in response to national or statewide electoral forces and without any random 
error or local factors to make them behave differently. 
With this assumption one can draw a seats-votes curve from district-level 
information  as follows:  the  first  point  plotted  on the  seats-votes  curve is the 
actual election result.  Then, one percentage  point is added to the vote in each 
district and new hypothetical values for statewide seats and votes are calculated REPRESENTATION  THROUGH LEGISLATIVE  REDISTRICTING  797 
FIGURE 3 
Seats-Votes Curve, Assuming Uniform Partisan Swing on the Logit Scale, Pennsylvania 
State Assembly, 1972 
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by aggregating these hypothetical district-level data. This procedure is repeated 
by  continuing to add (or subtract) these hypothetical votes  to each district in 
small increments until the entire curve is drawn. 
One problem with the uniform partisan swing assumption is that it is inter- 
nally inconsistent, since districts that already give lopsided victories for a can- 
didate will go over 100% or below 0% of the vote when creating new hypotheti- 
cal  elections.  However sensible  uniform  partisan  swing might  appear in  the 
competitive region near 50%, it is obviously incorrect at .the extremes. Fortu- 
nately, we can make a simple modification of the assumption to preserve at least 
internal consistency. The modification allows districts to move uniformly on the 
logit scale-so  districts with vote proportions near 0.5 will move nearly linearly, 
and districts close to the extremes will not go beyond the boundaries. 
Figure 3 presents an example of a seats-votes curve drawn with the uniform 
partisan swing on the logit scale assumption. The small square denotes the actual 
statewide election result, and the rest of the line was drawn with the assumption. 
Although  this  approach. does provide  a  reasonable  starting  point,  permitting Gary King 
FIGURE 4 
District-Level Electoral Swing, Pennsylvania State Assembly, 1972-74 
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some estimates to be made that would otherwise be impossible, it also has several 
severe weaknesses. First, the assumption is empirically false. Tracking real dis- 
tricts from election to election reveals approximate uniform shifting, but always 
with some variability. Figure 4 provides an example of this interelection  vari- 
ability; graphs for other pairs of elections look similar, although some have more 
and some less variability. If the uniform partisan swing assumption held exactly, 
all of the points in Figure 4 would fall on a straight line. They do fall somewhat 
near a straight line, but the evidence for variability around this line is unambigu- 
ous. A more reasonable model should explicitly take this variability into account. 
Furthermore, by assuming the absence of variability, all estimates of varia- 
tion across repeated hypothetical elections, including standard errors, are zero. 
Since politics  is  hardly  deterministic,  this  assumption  should  obviously  be 
changed. Incorporating this variability will yield estimators with more desirable 
statistical properties,  but  it  also  will  enable  analysts  to distinguish  observed 
changes that are unique from those that reflect significant changes in the under- 
lying electoral system. REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 
Mean Voter Preference Distributions 
The first  step  to  a  more  general  assumption  is  an  explicit  probabilistic 
mechanism.  The mechanism  ensures  that  individual  district  vote  proportions 
within a state are drawn randomly from some probability distribution rather than 
having to follow any particular deterministic pattern. Begin by letting V,  be the 
proportion of citizens in a legislative district who would cast their ballots for a 
Democratic candidate at time 1, which is generally the first election following a 
redistricting.'  The variable  V,  then varies across districts within a state. Since 
V,  is an unobserved random variable, I hypothesize  an underlying probability 
distribution, termed the mean voter preference distribution, from which an elec- 
tion in each district is randomly drawn. This is the point where stochastic vari- 
ability is explicitly recognized:  an unobserved  "electoral  system"  is assumed, 
and even  if  this  distribution remains constant  and the same election  were run 
again, observed electoral results will differ. These repeated elections will vary 
randomly around the true underlying electoral system. The assumptions we make 
later to derive the seats-votes curve will involve the underlying electoral system, 
rather than requiring the observed district-level vote proportions to follow any 
particular deterministic pattern. 
The distribution chosen must be flexible enough to include cases where it is 
unimodal, to allow for competitive electoral systems with most districts having 
proportions near 0.5; bimodal,  to allow for uncompetitive  party  systems with 
many successful incumbents in both parties; skewed, in the case of bias toward 
one of the parties; and combinations  of these.  Instead of this distribution, one 
could use a histogram of the proportion voting Democratic in each district across 
an actual state, but a model requires a mathematical formulation abstracting the 
key features of this histogram (i.e., bias and representation). 
Choosing a particular probability density to model the distribution of mean 
voter preferences across districts is no trivial matter. Deriving one by making 
assumptions about individual voters, their spatial arrangement, or the process of 
redistricting would narrow the range of possibilities only negligibly for present 
purposes,  as Quandt (1974) and Gudgin and Taylor (1979) demonstrate. Alter- 
natively,  one can choose an  existing  distribution  which  is  flexible enough to 
handle most interesting cases. Unfortunately, none exist in the literat~re.~  I have 
therefore derived the single probability distribution  of district-level votes that, 
'Alternatively,  time 1 could refer to any point after redistricting, but prior to the first election. 
Under this formulation we explicitly recognize that an electoral system exists at all points in time, 
even when it remains unobservable. 
*Obvious choices include the Beta distribution or one of those developed for correlation coef- 
ficients. Only the Beta distribution allows for bimodality but is not flexible enough for present pur- 
poses (see Johnson and Kotz 1972). 800  Gary King 
when aggregated to the statewide level, results in the bilogit seats-votes curve in 
equation  1. This new  distribution  encompasses a  large  variety  of  interesting 
cases that arise in this context. The distribution is defined on the interval (0, 1); 
special cases of it are unimodal, bimodal, peaked, uniform, skewed, and various 
combinations of these features. 
Begin by assuming that mean preference for Democratic candidates at time 
1 (V,) is distributed as the probability density in equation 4: 
This mean voter preference distribution has two parameters:  A,  which indexes 
direction and degree of  skewness, and p, which  indexes peakedness  (ranging 
from a single spike to extreme bimodality).  Combinations of  values  of  these 
parameters  produce  the  flexibility seen in the  examples drawn  in  the  second 
columns  of  Figures  1 and 2. On the basis of  the analyses  in the rest  of  this 
section, this distribution  allows one to separate reliably the degree of partisan 
bias  from the  form of  democratic  representation  in  a district-level  theoretical 
analysis in section 4 and empirical analysis in section 5. 
Deriving the Expected Seats-Votes Curve 
From this  distribution  of  district  means,  I  now  show how  to derive the 
expected seats-votes curve and observe how representation and bias operate. 
First, the expected value of this distribution [E(Vl) = p,]  is the average of 
all the district means-the  statewide proportion of voters preferring their respec- 
tive Democratic candidate. Second, the expected proportion of seats allocated to 
the Democrats  [E(Sl)], as a function of p, (and p and A),  is equal to the area 
under the V,  curve where the Democrats receive a majority. This is the area to 
the right of 0.5 Democratic votes. 
Given a particular probability  density describing  voter preferences  across 
the state, we use standard methods to calculate the expected votes and expected 
seats; these are the respective proportions of votes and seats that we would ob- 
serve on average across a large number of hypothetical replications of essentially 
the same election. Calculating the mathematical expectation-the  mean of the 
distribution-provides  expected votes [E(V,) = p,]. Since the total area under 
a probability distribution is always 1  .O,  the area under the curve to the right of 
V,  = 0.5 is equal to the expected proportion of those districts that elect a Demo- 
cratic candidate, E(S1). With E(Vl) = p, and E(Sl)  providing the coordinates, 
we draw a single point on the expected seats-votes curve. 
In order to draw other points on the expected seats-votes curve, the distri- 
bution of voter preferences must be systematically changed in some way. This 
requires an assumption about how the underlying electoral system will change in 
future  elections.  Uniform  partisan  swing  is  one possible  assumption.  Fortu- REPRESENTATION THROUGH  LEGISLATIVE  REDISTRICTING  80 I 
nately,  this  method  enables  one to relax  the  most  unrealistic  features  of  this 
assumption. 
In general,  A  and p fix the shape of the distribution. Some of the specific 
shapes are given in the second column of Figures  1 and 2, along with the values 
of  A  and p. Under  one possible assumption, as the  mean  of  the district vote 
proportions, p,  ,  varies, the shape of the probability density remains unchanged; 
this is equivalent to assuming that the values of A  and p remain the same as p, 
changes. Thus, when some national force impinges on all districts in the state, 
we no longer assume that the districts move together in lockstep. Instead, as the 
expected value (mean) shifts, only the shape of the distribution of district vote 
proportions must remain the same. Individual districts are free to vary randomly 
within this shape, with or without uniform partisan swing. Given this additional 
assumption, each shift of the mean, and thus the entire distribution, alters the 
value of p,  (mean votes) and also yields a corresponding area to the right of 0.5 
(mean seats); these serve as coordinates for an additional point on the seats-votes 
curve. For a given distribution, one continues to calculate points until the entire 
expected seats-votes curve is derived. 
Figure 5 portrays an example of  this assumption  where the shape of  the 
distribution of voter preferences is unbiased (A  = 0) and responsive (p = 4). 
This distribution  appears on the right  side of  the figure for mean Democratic 
votes (p,)  at 0.3, 0.4, and 0.6. To calculate the proportion of seats allocated to 
the Democratic party that corresponds to each of these statewide proportions of 
Democratic votes, I calculate  the area under the respective distribution  to the 
right of 0.5 (colored in black in the figure). The lowermost point on the seats- 
votes curve (also in Figure 5) was plotted from 0.3 mean Democratic votes (p,) 
and 0.03 mean Democratic seats (based on the area under the distribution to the 
right of 0.5). The next point was plotted at p, = 0.4 and mean seats 0.16, and 
the final point at p, = 0.6 and mean seats 0.84. In a similar manner, the entire 
set of points (0 < p, < 1) were calculated, and the complete seats-votes curve 
was drawn (see the smooth seats-votes curve in Figure 5). 
This fixed-shape assumption can be weakened still further, since we have 
thus  far constrained the degree and direction of  partisan bias  (A) and form of 
democratic representation  (p) to be unchanged as the statewide mean  of  voter 
preferences (p,)  ~aries.~  I therefore make the more general and even less restric- 
tive assumption that bias and representation may vary with the mean of the voter 
preference distribution and constrain only the area, not the shape, to change in 
a consistent way as p, varies.  Intuitively, this allows (but does not require) the 
three distributions in Figure 5 to be different shapes, as long as the area to each 
side of the 0.5 line remains equal to the areas shown in Figure 5 for these three 
91n fact, this latter assumption must be false in the extremes, for as w,  approaches 0 or 1, the 
distribution indicates that  some districts have Democratic candidates receiving more than  100% or 
less than 0% of the votes. FIGURE 5 
From Mean Voter Preference Distribution to Aggregate Seats-Votes Curve 
Republican Win  Democratic Win 
0.5 
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distributions. Mathematically, this assumption is expressed by using the standard 
tool for calculating the area under a curve-integration:1° 
where the integral is taken over p, instead of  V,  in order to properly constrain 
the area under the curve as the mean changes. For this equation to hold approxi- 
mately,  the  mean  voter preference  within  a district  must  have  some level  of 
inertia-something  reasonably assured due to the stability of party identification 
and the power of  incumbency. Unfortunately, since this assumption is about a 
probability  distribution that changes at each point in time, and from which we 
observe only one election at a time, it would be difficult to verify by  empirical 
investigation. Fortunately, it is considerably less restrictive than uniform partisan 
swing, incorporating plausible systematic changes in the distribution, as well as 
allowing for random variability. 
By substituting equation 4, the probability density function, into equation 5 
and integrating, I use this improved assumption to derive the time  1 seats-votes 
curve: 
The second line of this equation is an algebraic simplification of the original 
bilogit form in equation 3, with p, = V."  As such, p  and A  can be interpreted 
as before in Figures  1 and  2. In fact, each mean voter preference  distribution 
portrayed  in these figures gives rise to a corresponding seats-votes curve drawn 
beside it through the use of the new and more general assumption in equation 6. 
The p  and A parameters are the same for both in each pair.I2 
Figure 1 shows how one type of bimodal mean voter preference distribution 
(0 < p  < 1) leads to an unresponsive seats-votes curve. A bimodal distribution 
occurs when both  parties  have many  noncompetitive  districts  or very popular 
incumbents.  The seats-votes curve is  unresponsive  in such cases because  the 
IoThis integral is only an approximation if  A  # 0. 
"In order to go the other way, from a given statewide seats-votes curve to the district-level 
probability distribution of votes, one would differentiate. 
I2Intuition  about this functional form can be developed through the graphs presented in the text 
or direct mathematical analysis. For the latter, consider that this form is the inverse of  the logit of 
votes embedded within another logit. As  such, the equation can look like a logit or an exaggerated 
or dampened form of  a logit. The inverse logit and logit can even cancel out, resulting in a linear 
relationship. (For other purposes one could use this functional form to test for the linear probability 
versus logit model, as this form embeds both in a more general model; see Achen 1986). 804  Gary King 
division of  seats between the parties does not change unless voter preferences 
dramatically change. With smaller swings, the incumbents get smaller or larger 
majorities, with partisan turnover occurring only in the few marginal seats. Since 
the early 1970s, scholars of congressional elections have been interested in the 
problem of  vanishing marginals-the  recent tendency of  most districts to be- 
come less competitive. Equation 4 provides an explicit model of this phenome- 
non by  letting  voter preferences  (with p  < 1) follow  a bimodal  distribution. 
Congressional scholars have posited many possible causes for this trend toward 
bimodality.I3 Below,  I explicitly model the process by which incumbency can 
lead to bimodality and, hence, unresponsiveness and also show how the recent 
increased variation in partisan swing (Jacobson 1987) can have a similar effect. 
When voter preferences are uniformly distributed across districts (p = I), 
de facto proportional representation results. A unimodal distribution (1 < p < 
w) results in a majoritarian electoral system because larger numbers of marginal 
districts  make  seat  allocation  more  responsive  to  small  changes  in  citizen 
preferences. 
The mean voter preference distributions in the second column of Figure 2 
are all skewed, with the bulk of the area over the Democratic end of the con- 
tinuum. When these are mapped onto a seats-votes curve with equation 6, skew- 
ness in the distribution becomes partisan bias in the seats-votes curve. 
Even assuming that individual voters do not change their preferences,  the 
distribution of voter preferences across districts is altered by redistricting. Those 
who control the redistricting process-or,  equivalently, determine the values of 
p and A-may  be partisan or bipartisan legislators or statewide elected officials, 
bipartisan  or nonpartisan redistricting commissions, or state or federal courts. 
This control is constrained by factors such as natural and political geography. In 
addition, districts must be contiguous, have roughly equal numbers of  inhabi- 
tants, and usually  must be compact. Citizens with a particular political prefer- 
ence do not always live in locations convenient to those overseeing redistricting. 
The latter may also have to contend with local political elites, forge compromises 
in state legislatures or with governors of different political parties, satisfy exist- 
I3In congressional elections the two modes are closer to 0.5 than in  Figure 2. The possible 
causes of  this trend toward  bimodality  in  congressional elections  may  include an  increase in  the 
electoral advantage of incumbency due to constituency service (Fiorina 1977); bipartisan gerryman- 
dering, where in states with split party control cross-party deals are struck so that the lines drawn 
protect  incumbents of  both  parties  (Mayhew  1971; Tufte  1973); partisan  gerrymandering, where 
states with unified party control give the minority party a few seats with very high margins of victory 
and most seats to themselves with similar high margins (Owen and Grofman 1988); a decline in the 
influence of  party identification on mass voting behavior (Erikson  1972; Burnham  1974), or some 
combination of  these factors. Somewhat more unlikely,  but  still theoretically  possible,  causes of 
increasing unresponsiveness are geographically located clusters of like-minded voters tending to be 
larger than the size of congressional districts (Gudgin and Taylor 1979) or an increase in the political 
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ing incumbents or prospective candidates, or include specific landmarks or geo- 
graphical areas in a particular legislator's district.  l4 
Partisan gerrymanderers are likely to try to bias the system in their own 
party's  favor. If  their majority is large, they might also attempt to insulate their 
party  by  creating an unresponsive system and bimodal voter preference distri- 
bution (p < 1; see Owen  and Grofman  1988). However, successful partisan 
gerrymanderers will also try to release the grasp that opposition party incum- 
bents have on their districts, thus leading to a more responsive electoral system. 
In this case a relatively responsive party system (large p) would be ideal, in that 
it would facilitate winning back seats from vulnerable incumbents or claiming 
open seats vacated as incumbents retire.I5 
Districting plans may also be drawn by bipartisan groups, particularly when 
the governor and both houses of  the state legislature are not controlled by the 
same party. In some states, bipartisan redistricting commissions are created by 
provisions  in  the  state constitution. In  these situations redistricting plans  are 
compromises worked  out  among  incumbents of  different  parties.  The  result 
should be redistricting with no partisan bias or, minimally, no change in bias. In 
addition, deals between the political parties will likely benefit the incumbents of 
both  parties considerably, resulting in an  even more bimodal voter preference 
distribution and, hence, a less responsive electoral system. 
Strictly nonpartisan groups may  also be responsible for redistricting. For 
example, courts with no partisan predispositions may draw the maps themselves 
or may  commission special masters to redistrict under strict court guidelines. 
Although many of these are de facto partisan or bipartisan plans (Dixon 1968), 
a few  are truly nonpartisan. While not as common as partisan or bipartisan re- 
districting, this case is of  considerable theoretical interest. These circumstances 
should lead  to very  small bias  (A  = 0) and  a more responsive, majoritarian 
electoral system (large p). 
4.  Theoretical Analysis 
In  order to evaluate precisely how  redistricting alters the  distribution of 
mean voter preferences, I now incorporate partisan swing and incumbency vot- 
"Despite  these countervailing constraints,  most would assume that individuals  in charge of 
redistricting influence representation and bias and, in my notation, effectively choose values of p and 
A,  thereby determining the distribution of voter preferences across districts. Below, this assumption 
is borne  out  empirically,  insofar  as 1 find  that  redistricting  does have predictable  effects  in the 
short run. 
15Furthermore, many of  the states that exercise partisan  control of  the redistricting  process 
have competitive party systems, since redistricting is of little consequence in one-party states. These 
competitive party states are also likely to have electoral systems that are relatively responsive and 
hence have larger values of p. Glazer, Grofman, and Robbins (1987, 702-04)  give four additional 
reasons why  "redistricting  plans  in the  1970s . . . did not resemble  the classic  prescription  for 
optimal partisan gerrymandering." Gary King 
ing effects in a model of change from time 1 to time 2. Time 2 is coincident with 
an election-either  the first post-redistricting election, if time 1 was prior to the 
first election, or the second election, if time 1 was at the first election. In the first 
subsection,  I introduce both  incumbency and  partisan  swing as fixed effects. 
After that, I allow the effect of partisan swing to vary randomly across districts 
within the state. The object in both sections is to discover how democratic rep- 
resentation and partisan bias are affected by these features of American politics 
that occur independently of and following redistricting. 
Incumbency and Partisan Swing 
The first model takes partisan swing, denoted as E,  to be fixed over districts. 
Incumbency is indexed by y. Partisan swing can favor either the Democrats (E > 
O),  the Republicans (E < 0), or, on average, neither party (E = 0). National 
factors (a  presidential  election  or  midterm  congressional  election), statewide 
factors (a popular gubernatorial candidate), a political scandal, or an important 
local or ;egional  issue account for some of these partisan swings.  l6 
Incumbency (with y > 1) is modeled to have the predicted effect of pushing 
a district with a Democratic victory  at time 1 (V, > 0.5) toward  favoring the 
Democrats and pushing a district with a time 1 Republican victory (V, < 0.5) 
toward favoring the Republicans, even more at time 2 than time 1. Incumbency 
is also assumed to affect each district in a similar manner. Relaxing this assump- 
tion (i.e.,  including a dichotomous variable and allowing some but not all dis- 
tricts to have incumbents) would not materially alter the conclusions. 
In order to incorporate partisan swing (E) and incumbency (y) effects in a 
model with representation (p)  and bias (A),,we  need to study how the distribution 
derived above changes from election to election. The first task is to formulate a 
model that has the Democratic vote proportion at time 2 (V2) varying as a func- 
tion of Democratic votes at time 1 (V,) and the partisan swing and incumbency 
parameters. Many functional forms would give E and y the proper interpretation, 
but a particularly convenient form for a model of district-level electoral change 
is the one we used in equation 5 for a different purpose:I7 
161n this version of the model, partisan swing is assumed to affect all districts in the state in a 
similar manner. This initial model is also somewhat more sophisticated, since it allows a district with 
mean Democratic voter preference of, say, 0.99 and one of, say, 0.50 to respond differently to a 
swing toward the Democrats  (otherwise the  mean proportion  favoring the Democrats  in the  first 
district would be greater than  1.0, an impossibility, or would  unnecessarily  restrict  swing in the 
second). This model should not be confused with the assumption in equation 5,  which does not refer 
to real change over time. 
"Many  other assumptions for the form of equation 7 lead to similar substantive results. Addi- 
tionally, the model of change in equation 7 can include an additive disturbance, with mean zero and 
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In this formula V2 is larger when V,  is larger. Without any partisan swing 
(F = 0) or incumbency effect (y = l), this form has Democratic votes at time 
2 equaling Democratic votes at time 1: 
With some incumbency effect (y > l), district parties winning at time 1 receive 
a bonus at time 2; the larger y is, the larger the bonus. Unlike incumbency effects 
this  functional form models partisan swing to  affect all districts in  the same 
direction: a Democratic swing (E > 0) helps Democratic candidates (whether 
they win or lose at time 1) in every district and a Republican swing (E <  0) helps 
all Republicans. 
Given the mean voter preference distribution and corresponding expected 
seats-votes curve introduced in the last section to apply to time 1, and the model 
of electoral change from time 1 to time 2 in equation 7, no further assumptions 
are necessary to derive the expected seats-votes curve for time 2. Appendix A 
demonstrates how to use the methodology of  stochastic modeling to derive the 
time 2 results and proves that the time 2 mean voter preference distribution is as 
follows: 
and the corresponding expected seats-votes curve is 
The relationship between the seats-votes curves and between the mean voter 
preference distributions at times 1 and 2 elucidates the effects of partisan swing 
and incumbency voting on democratic representation and partisan bias. The gen- 
eral mathematical forms of the time 1 and time 2 seats-votes curves (equations 6 
and 10) and mean voter preference distributions.  (equations 4 and 9) remain un- 
changed. However, the representation parameter changes from p in the time  1 
equation to ply in time 2, and the partisan bias parameter changes from A in time 
1 to (A  + &ply)  in time 2. Since only the parameters, and not the form of these 
distributions, have changed, the parameters have the same interpretation as in 
Figures 1 and 2; the only difference is that both now have several components. 
For example, the new representation parameter, ply, means that time 1 represen- 
tation (p) is reduced by  the magnitude of  the incumbency effect-so  that the 
allocation of  legislative seats is less responsive to changes in citizen votes. In 
addition, three interesting results emerge from this model for partisan bias at 
time 2. 808  Gary King 
First, in the absence of  partisan swing (E = 0), partisan bias remains un- 
changed since time 2 representation reduces to that in time 1: (A  + &ply) = 
(A  + Oply) = A.  This result holds regardless of the form of time 1 representation 
or the extent of any incumbency effect. 
Second, since ply is always positive, partisan bias always changes from 
time 1 to time 2 in the direction of partisan swing. For example, for any degree 
of  bias in time  1, a swing toward the Republicans after that time results in  a 
system more biased toward the Republicans (or less biased toward the Demo- 
crats). Since the distribution of votes gives positive probability only for intervals 
of  votes between zero and one, partisan swing in any direction must skew the 
mean voter preference distribution. Skewness, in turn, produces additional bias 
in the expected seats-votes curve. 
Finally, the influence of  partisan swing (E) on time 2 partisan bias (A  + 
&ply)  is dependent on the form of representation at time 2 (ply). For example, 
suppose ply is greater than one. In other words, time 1 representation is majori- 
tarian and a relatively small incumbency effect occurs.  l8 The consequence of this 
relatively responsive system at time 2 is that the effect of partisan swing has an 
exaggerated effect on partisan bias.  Conversely, when ply < 1, the electoral 
system is unresponsive. This might occur either with an unresponsive system at 
time 1 and an incumbency effect of  any size or with a large incumbency effect 
and any form of  time 1 representation. As a result of  this situation, legislative 
seats are unresponsive to citizen votes. In this situation even a large partisan 
swing against the favored party is unlikely to have a very large effect on time 2 
partisan bias. 
Random Partisan Swing 
In the foregoing analysis, partisan swing is a fixed parameter, affecting all 
districts uniformly. This is appropriate if the factors producing the swing are the 
result of  national or statewide factors. However, in  some states and at some 
times, partisan swing is likely to be more variable across districts. For example, 
in  extremely heterogeneous states, the assumption of  all districts reacting in 
similar ways or even in the same direction is implausible. In many states people 
in urban areas may respond to  political events with precisely opposite opinions 
to those in rural areas. Random partisan swing should also be more prevalent in 
states without strong party systems. 
Accordingly, in this section, I take the partisan swing parameter (E) to be a 
random variable across districts instead of a constant. This formulation necessi- 
tates a revised stochastic model, incorporating an assumption about the way  E is 
distributed, in a probabilistic sense, across districts. 
181n theory ply > 1 could also occur in other systems with reverse incumbency effects-where 
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Since the interpretation of E is symmetric about zero, the probability density 
should also be symmetric, but with parameters for the mean and variation about 
the mean. I assume, for simplicity, that E varies according to a Uniform distri- 
bution on the interval T - 0 to T + 0.19 In this distribution,  E has a mean of 
E(E) -- r, with 0 > 0 a measure of  variation around r. As 0 approaches zero, 
this distribution collapses into a spike over T,  where E (now equal to r)  is a fixed 
parameter again. In general, E is now a random variable with mean r and disper- 
sion 0. 
Given  the time  1 mean voter preference distribution and the assumption 
about how time 2 vote proportions depend on time  1 votes, incumbency, and 
constant partisan swing effects, the methods of stochastic modeling (in Appendix 
A) permitted the derivation of a new  time 2 distribution and corresponding ex- 
pected seats-votes curve. By making only one additional assumption-that  E  is 
a uniformly distributed random variable-we  can derive a new time 2 distribu- 
tion and expected seats-votes curve. Appendix B demonstrates how to use the 
methods of stochastic modeling techniques to derive these new results. 
The new time 2 mean voter preference distribution and corresponding ex- 
pected seats-votes curve appearing in Appendix B are somewhat more difficult 
to interpret than  the results in the preceding section, since the mathematical 
forms of these equations are considerably more complex. However, one can still 
ascertain how the form of democratic representation and the degree and direction 
of partisan bias change in these equations. Through graphing and some direct 
mathematical analysis, several interesting points emerge. First, with small varia- 
tion  in  partisan swing across a state (small 0), these equations operate quite 
similarly to equations 9 and  10 in the last section, respectively. The mean of 
partisan swing (7)  plays roughly the same role as time 1 partisan bias (A).  Time 
1 representation (p) and incumbency (y) also have similar effects. 
Variations in partisan swing across districts, however, have very different 
effects in these equations: the more partisan swing varies across districts, the less 
responsive legislative seats are to changes in citizen votes. When partisan swing 
has similar effects on all districts in a state-as,  for example, in relatively ho- 
mogeneous states or those with very competitive party systems-the  proportion 
of seats allocated to a party is considerably more responsive to small changes in 
aggregate voter preferences. 
These effects are illustrated in Figure 6. The two graphs in the first row are 
I9I also tried the Normal and Logistic probability densities, but these made the analysis below 
analytically intractable. With numerical integration I was able to verify that the substantive results 
are quite similar to those presented in the text. I therefore stick to the simpler uniform density. 
One should not confuse the procedure in this section with Butler's (1951) method of deriving 
the seats-votes curve. The latter is misnamed "uniform  partisan swing"  (it should really be called 
"constant partisan swing"),  but it is an assumption used for a purpose completely different from the 
dynamic model in this section. Gary King 
FIGURE 6 
Voter Preference Distributions with Random Partisan Swing 
drawn with no bias or mean partisan swing in time 1. Since ply is greater than 
1, the curve on the top left (with a small variation in partisan swing, 0 = 0.01) 
is unimodal,  indicating  a relatively  steep majoritarian seats-votes curve (not 
pictured). The graph at the top right has all parameters set equal to those in the 
graph at the top left, except that it allows for more variation in partisan swing (0 
= 2.0). This changes the unimodal distribution into a bimodal distribution, es- 
sentially depressing the middle of the range of the distribution and hence making 
the electoral system unresponsive. The two graphs in the second row are drawn 
with bias favoring the Democrats; the effect of  13 is essentially the same in this 
instance, making the biased curve somewhat less responsive as 
>OThis result suggests that the list of possible causes for declining competitiveness in congres- 
sional elections enumerated in note  13 is incomplete. The mean voter preference distribution can REPRESENTATION  THROUGH  LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  81 I 
Summary of  Theoretical Results 
The stochastic model developed above provides a precise and flexible for- 
malization of  democratic representation and partisan bias and clarifies the very 
important distinctions between these concepts. As the foregoing analysis dem- 
onstrates, the concepts of  partisan swing and incumbency voting from the con- 
gressional elections literature have determinate effects on representation and 
bias, concepts from the seats-votes literature. Incumbency reduces the respon- 
siveness of the electoral system, whereas partisan swing affects whether the sys- 
tem is biased toward one party or the other. Incumbency and other causes of 
unresponsive representation also reduce the effect of partisan swing on current 
levels of  partisan' bias. Finally, in  states where partisan swings are relatively 
constant across districts-such  as those with highly competitive party systems- 
the allocation of legislative seats to political parties after elections is likely to be 
much more responsive to changes in citizen votes. When partisan swing is more 
variable across districts, responsiveness declines. 
5.  Empirical Analyses 
In Davis v. Bandemer (478 U. S.  [1986]), the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
political gerrymandering justiciable for the first time. Particularly since this case, 
and the district court case leading to it (Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F.  Supp. 1479 
[S.D. Ind. 1984]), scholars of redistricting have put considerable effort into de- 
riving measures of bias on the basis of one or relatively few election years (see, 
e.g., Grofman 1985a; Cain 1985b; Niemi  1985; Backstrom, Robins, and Eller 
1978). Although many creative solutions have been proposed, the method intro- 
duced here derives from an explicit formal model using well-accepted statistical 
theory. 
Although the method, described below, could be applied to any two-party 
electoral system, I illustrate the potential of this estimator with an application to 
U.S. state legislatures. The analysis that follows is not meant as an empirical test 
of the model, only as an illustration of its potential. I choose the lower chamber 
of state legislatures for empirical analysis rather than the U. S. Congress because 
very few states have enough congressional districts to do complete year-by-year 
analyses. Additionally, congressional redistricting processes are fairly uniform 
across the states. State legislative redistricting is controlled in more diverse ways 
(Hardy, Heslop, and Anderson 1981). Finally, state legislative redistricting is 
usually presumed more consequential in that all of  the members of  the (state) 
legislature are affected by  a single, centrally controlled, redistricting process. 
also become bimodal when voters in different districts respond to different cues, and hence, partisan 
swing becomes more variable across districts. This cause is implicit in the arguments of Erikson and 
Burnham, who believe that the decline in the party system is a major factor in the declining com- 
petitiveness of congressional elections. 812  Gary King 
When a single state legislature redraws congressional district lines, only a hand- 
ful of members of the entire Congress are affected by the change. 
The specific evidence I present in this section is based on data from assem- 
bly elections in six states. The redistricting processes were partisan in two states, 
bipartisan in two, and nonpartisan in the final two.21  I use the 1970-71 redistrict- 
ing, since the  1970s has  a complete set of  elections following the decennial 
census; a number of  important court decisions during the 1960s brought about 
numerous reapportionments throughout that decade, and the decade of the 1980s 
is still unfinished. 
For 1968 and 1970, and for each of the five elections following the 1970-71 
redistricting, I conduct a separate analysis. The goal is to estimate p and A by 
applying maximum likelihood to the probability distribution developed in equa- 
tion 4. The basic idea of  maximum likelihood analysis is to begin with  this 
probability distribution, with which one can calculate the absolute uncertainty of 
any range of  district-level electoral outcomes, given values for p and  A.  This 
measure is summarized as a "probability density," f(v,  I p, A).  Thus, p and A 
are assumed fixed, and the probability gives one a measure of the absolute un- 
certainty of different outcomes of  v, . However, inference is an exactly opposite 
problem, where the data, v, ,  are known, and p and A are to be estimated. Thus, 
maximum likelihood methods use the likelihood function L(A, p  (  v,) as a rela- 
tive measure of uncertainty. One then maximizes the likelihood function, which 
is assumed proportional to the probability distribution, with respect to p and A. 
This produces the values of  p and  A  that maximize the relative probability of 
getting the data we  actually observe (see King  1989). A computer program to 
implement this estimator is available from the author.22 
Note that the full stochastic model was more refined than the part to be used 
21The  particular states were chosen on the basis of the availability of electoral data and suffi- 
cient information about the redistricting process, both of which are in surprisingly short supply and 
limited availability. The data for this study were individually coded from 4,642 electoral districts 
in  seven election  years  across  six  states  from  the  "Blue  Books"  provided  by  their  respective 
governments. 
"In  practice the log-likelihood function gives the same results as the likelihood function and 
is easier to work with computationally. The log-likelihood is derived by taking the product over the 
D electoral districts and then taking logs: 
where v,, is the proportion of votes from the Democrats in district  i at time 1. Note that the presence 
of the second term of this expression requires that p and A be estimated jointly. Numerical maximi- 
zation methods are used to derive estimates and standard errors from this function. Seats are repre- 
sented implicitly in this function because they are deterministic functions of votes at the district level. REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  813 
in  the empirical analyses. As  a result of  omitting the effects of  incumbency 
voting and partisan swing effects, these empirical analyses are only broadly in- 
dicative of general patterns and trends. 
Note that the effects of  partisan swing and incumbency voting analyzed in 
section 3 have effects on partisan bias and representation separate from any po- 
tential redistricting effects. The estimates of p and A in the exploratory empirical 
analysis of this section thus serve only to gauge aggregate patterns. No statistical 
bias is introduced by  omitting these effects from the empirical analysis. A very 
important topic for future research is to partial out explicitly the components of 
these broad patterns attributable to redistricting, random partisan swing,  and 
incumbency effects.  23 
Effects of Redistricting in Partisan States 
Indiana  and  Connecticut, the  two  states with  partisan redistricting pro- 
cesses, were controlled by the Republican party immediately following the 1970 
census. In 197 1 the Republican party controlled the house, senate, and gover- 
nor's office in Indiana. The redistricting plan was implemented just prior to the 
1972 election in  a party line vote in both houses, partially in response to the 
Whitcomb v.  Chavis .(403 U.S. 124 [1971]) Supreme Court decision allowing 
multimember districts.24  Connecticut's redistricting process was controlled by a 
three-member board composed of one Democrat, one Republican, and one sup- 
posedly neutral tie-breaker. Although the purpose of the board was to produce a 
bipartisan plan, with seats allocated among the parties in approximate proportion 
to their votes, the Republicans had effective control of the board. The Democrats 
even went to court, claiming an "invidious gerrymander,"  and sought to have 
the plan  invalidated, but they did not succeed (see Gafiey v. Cummings 412 
U.S. 735  [1973]). Both Indiana and Connecticut are strongly competitive two- 
party states. 
As expected, partisan bias moves closer to the Republicans from 1970 to 
1972 in both Indiana and Connecticut; further, these electoral systems become 
somewhat more responsive (i .e.,  have larger values of  p) as the Republican ger- 
rymanderers attempted to make Democratic strongholds into marginal districts 
in these competitive states. These effects are conspicuous in Tables 1 and 2, as 
230ne  could not simply use the  distribution derived in Appendix B, with  incumbency  and 
random partisan  swing, with  a  single  year  of electoral  data  since the  parameters  would  not  be 
identified. 
"The  few multimember districts were coded as "single member districts" according to the 
following procedure: the Democratic candidates were ranked according to votes received from high- 
est to lowest; Republican candidates were ranked from lowest to highest. Then each candidate pair 
was entered as if they were competing against each other in a single-member  plurality voting election. 
This  procedure  reproduces the correct winning  and  losing candidates. Several other procedures, 
including dropping multimember districts entirely, were tried with no substantial change in substan- 
tive conclusions. 814  Gary King 
TABLE 1 
Partisan Redistricting in Indiana 
Year  A  SE  o  SE  Districts 
TABLE 2 
Partisan Redistricting in Connecticut 
Year  A  SE  P  -  SE  Districts 
both states move from slightly biased toward the Democrats to substantially bi- 
ased toward  the Republicans  after the redi~tricting.~~  Representation  also be- 
comes more responsive in' both states, although somewhat more so in Indiana 
than in Connecticut. By themselves, these short-term effects are quite signifi- 
25The  best way to interpret the values of p and A is from Figures 1 and 2. For A one can also 
calculate a percentage  figure,  but  since partisan  bias can be different depending  on the value  of 
aggregate votes (v), this percentage is a function of  v. A general way to measure bias in percentage 
form is to take some value of votes, say vo, and to evaluate the difference between the curve, given 
p, A, and vo, and the curve, given p, A  = 0, and vo: 
This expression cannot be simplified in the general case. But one can easily use this to calculate the REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  815 
cant, since some empirical studies of gerrymandering have quite a difficult time 
demonstrating any effect  at  all (see Gallagher 1975; Cain  1985; Born  1985; 
Glazer, Grofman, and Robbins 1987).26 
However, these initial effects of  political gerrymandering were impercep- 
tible in both states after only one additional election. With the 1974 Watergate 
swing toward the Democratic party, a 1972 bias toward the Republicans is over- 
turned. This Democratic bias then gets smaller as the decade proceeds, but in 
neither state does it return to favoring the Republican party. The increase in 
responsiveness, presumably a result of redistricting, appears to get overtaken by 
incumbency effects and increases in the variance of  partisan swing across the 
state (the latter was noted by  Scarrow  1982, 820, in Connecticut). With few 
exceptions p declines steadily in both Indiana and Connecticut. 
These results confirm the predicted direction of partisan redistricting effects 
in the short term. Unfortunately, since the model does not explicitly partial out 
the effects of redistricting for future years, the analysis does not make clear the 
long-term effects of  redistricting. Consistent with these results are situations 
where redistricting effects are nonexistent, are swamped by the dynamic effects 
of  partisan swing and incumbency voting, or are very important but not deci- 
pherable.  Since a  much  more  complicated model  is  required  to  distinguish 
among these possibilities, this task is left to future research. 
Furthermore, these results confirm Scarrow's (1982) analysis that the elec- 
toral system was biased in the short term by the redistricting, although he may. 
have slightly overestimated the 1970 Democratic advantage and underestimated 
the  1972 Republican bias.  It also dramatically confirms his finding about the 
transitory effectiveness of this redistricting. 
Effects of Redistricting in Bipartisan States 
Much of  the literature suggests that bipartisan bodies charged with redis- 
tricting responsibilities will split the advantage and tend to make A close to zero 
or, at a minimum, leave bias substantially unchanged. Furthermore, since both 
parties are likely to protect their respective incumbents, redistricting should leave 
p noticeably smaller, making the allocation of  legislative seats more insulated 
from small changes in voter preferences. 
- 
bias given A, p, and a particular value of  v. One special case, which is likely to be chosen in many 
instances, is v  = 0.5. In this case, this equation simplifies to: 
Of  course, this is only part of the relationship and cannot really be substituted for the value of  A. 
The parameter A  cannot be reduced to a single percentage,  since the former represents a complete 
nonlinear relationship, whereas the latter is only a linear difference. 
26The  arguments in this paper all suggest comparing estimates among years within each state 
only. See King and Browning (1987) for an analysis of interstate differences. Gary King 
TABLE 3 
Bipartisan Redistricting in Pennsylvania 
Year  A  SE  D  SE  Districts 
TABLE 4 
Bipartisan Redistricting in Wisconsin 
Year  A  SE  P  SE  Districts 
1968  -0.145  0.253  1.197  0.060  100 
1970  0.710  0.196  2.495  0.250  100 
1972  0.371  0.194  1.547  0.075  99 
1974  0.565  0.315  0.620  0.061  99 
1976  0.287  0.214  0.794  0.042  99 
1978  0.556  0.344  0.674  0.069  99 
1980  0.082  0.188  0.481  0.034  99 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are the bipartisan states in the sample. In Wis- 
consin a Republican senate, Democratic house, and Democratic governor failed 
to agree on a redistricting' plan  in  1971, but an acceptable compromise was 
worked  out during the  1972 session (Hagensick 1981). Pennsylvania was  re- 
quired by its state constitution to use a bipartisan commission. The commission 
was comprised of five members, two of which were Democrats and two Repub- 
licans. The fifth member was appointed by the state supreme court when the two 
partisan groups could not compromise on the remaining member. A bipartisan 
agreement was eventually reached among all members of the commission (see 
Wise 1981). 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that  A  and p changed in predicted ways in these 
bipartisan states. Pennsylvania was fairly biased toward the Democrats in 1970; 
immediately following this bipartisan redistricting, partisan bias was essentially 
nonexistent. In Wisconsin the substantial Democratic bias in  1970 was  nearly REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  817 
halved  following  the  redistricting.  More  critically,  and  also  as  expected,  p 
dropped sharply from 1970 to 1972 in both states, making the allocation of leg- 
islative seats in both states considerably less responsive to changes in  citizen 
votes. 
Even given these short-term' effects of legislative redistricting, these bipar- 
tisan states behaved like the other states in the years after 1972. In Pennsylvania 
the 1974 national Democratic swing increased bias toward the Democrats almost 
back to the level of the pre-redistricting 1970 election. This lasted for another 
election, followed by another sharp drop to negligible partisan bias. In Wiscon- 
sin the 1974 Democratic swing did not have such pronounced effects, but the 
general pattern of  post-redistricting bias  was  similar. Representation in  both 
states generally became less responsive over the decade, although it was some- 
what more variable in Pennsylvania. 
Effects of Redistricting in Nonpartisan States 
The term "nonpartisan"  is frequently a misnomer. Even avowedly nonpar- 
tisan judges and others sometimes have partisan agendas. Close historical analy- 
sis reveals that  Iowa and Washington state were most  nearly  nonpartisan for 
present purposes. When the Iowa supreme court ruled the proposed legislative 
plan unconstitutional (on the basis of malapportionment, not bias), it drew up its 
own self-consciously nonpartisan plan to meet standards of  minimal population 
deviations. The legislature essentially ratified the process by  passing a law re- 
quiring "nonpartisan standards and processes" (Liittschwager 198  1, 1  18, 1973). 
Washington state has a history of acrimonious redistricting battles, and the elec- 
tion of  a Republican house and Democratic senate in  1970 added fuel to the 
usual fire. When the legislature could not agree, the federal court appointed a 
University of  Washington geography professor as a special master to supervise 
the drawing of  district lines. From all accounts, including his own, Professor 
Morrill's goal was to achieve an equitable and genuinely nonpartisan plan (see 
Morrill 1973a, 1973b). 
The model developed above suggests that nonpartisan redistricting in these 
states will have different effects than in the partisan or bipartisan states. Presum- 
ably, a true nonpartisan would be interested in what is good for the electoral 
system as a whole rather than for any one political party. As such, nonpartisan 
redistricting should result in low levels of partisan bias and a much more respon- 
sive majoritarian electoral system. 
Tables 5 and 6 indicate that redistricting seemed to have roughly these ef- 
fects. Post-redistricting bias was relatively low in both states, although somewhat 
higher in Washington, where it actually increased slightly (but still within a sin- 
gle standard error bound). However, given that bias began at a low level in these 
states, the change in the form of  democratic representation is even more signifi- 
cant: both states had dramatically more responsive systems immediately follow- 818  Gary King 
TABLE 5 
Nonpartisan Redistricting in Iowa 
Year  A  SE  p  SE  Districts 
TABLE 6 
Nonpartisan Redistricting in Washington State 
Year  A  SE  o  SE  Districts 
ing redistricting; p more than doubled in Iowa and nearly doubled in Washing- 
ton.  Although  this  provides some justification  for  groups  such  as  Common 
Cause, who want to take political redistricting out of the hands of  partisan ger- 
rymanderers, even the effect of these nonpartisan redistricting plans seem to be 
quickly overtaken, or covered over, by incumbency and partisan swing. Over the 
course of  the next decade, Iowa and Washington exhibit both Democratic and 
Republican biases. Furthermore, neither state attains its 1972 peak in democratic 
responsiveness a second time. In both states p decreases just  as quickly as  it 
increased following redistricting. 
Summary of  Empirical Results 
In the short run redistricting appears to have effects in predicted directions. 
Partisan gerrymandering biases the system in favor of the party in control and, 
by  freeing up seats held by opposition party incumbents, increases the system's REPRESENTATION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  819 
responsiveness. Bipartisan-controlled redistricting appears to reduce bias some- 
what and dramatically to reduce responsiveness. Nonpartisan redistricting pro- 
cesses substantially increase the systems responsiveness, but do not have as clear 
an effect on partisan bias. 
The two nonpartisan states studied, Iowa and Washington, had quite low 
biases prior to redistricting; so nonpartisan redistricting plans could not have 
dramatically reduced partisan bias. A plausible speculation here is that the exist- 
ing low pre-redistricting partisan bias was a key factor in the states' decisions to 
impose nonpartisan plans. If  bias were more substantial earlier on, partisan or 
bipartisan plans might have been used. 
Across all the states, clear evidence was found that redistricting had little 
staying power. The forces of incumbency, partisan swing, demographic move- 
ments, candidate decisions, and other factors appeared to have considerable ef- 
fect on the underlying electoral system, even after accounting for the effects of 
redistricting. After only two elections, prima facie evidence for redistricting ef- 
fects evaporate in most states. For example, even in those states where partisan 
bias was increased by  the redistricting process, bias was not a problem by  the 
end of the decade. 
In addition, across every state and every type of redistricting process, re- 
sponsiveness declined significantly over the course of the decade. This is clear 
evidence that the phenomenon of  "vanishing marginals," recognized first in the 
U.S. Congress literature, also applies to these different types of state legislative 
assemblies.  Although this  finding cannot definitively establish any  particular 
cause of  this trend as the right one, it can help to rule out one: since the pattern 
exists across every type of redistricting process, redistricting plans that protect 
bipartisan incumbency could not account for all or even most of the effect. In- 
deed, even in those states where incumbency protection plans were not imposed, 
responsiveness continued to drop over the decade following the redi~tricting.~~ 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
This study generalizes the aggregate theory of representation in King and 
Browning (1987) to allow for the possibility that legislative seats are unrespon- 
sive to citizen votes. It also uncovers some of the more fundamental district-level 
relationships that give rise to these concepts, defined on the level of the political 
system. A formal stochastic model of these district-level processes demonstrated 
the precise effects of incumbency and fixed and random partisan swing on rep- 
='To demonstrate that this effect holds more broadly, I also conducted a test for the trend 
toward unresponsive representation in congressional elections by  modifying the model in King and 
Browning (1987) and allowing p to vary linearly with time. In 85% of the 44 states in the reanalysis, 
the responsiveness of congressional seats to legislative votes was found to be declining. These state- 
level results on responsiveness are consistent with congressional research that finds bimodality across 
districts nationwide. 820  Gary King 
resentation and bias.  The paper also provides theoretical and  some empirical 
evidence that partisan,.bipartisan, and nonpartisan redistricting plans have strong 
predictable short-term effects on state electoral politics. Although the model de- 
veloped here produces  estimates of  representation and bias  with  data from a 
single election year, it does not enable one completely to determine the causes 
of  these features of  electoral systems. Future research will therefore have to 
construct an explicit causal model so that the effects of  redistricting, partisan 
swing, incumbency, differential turnout, and other factors on representation and 
bias may be disentangled. 
Along the way several other contributions were also made. First, a critical 
assumption in this literature, dating back nearly four decades (Butler 1951), has 
been relaxed. Second, the study formally combines the scholarly literature on 
legislative redistricting with that on the decline in competitiveness, and increas- 
ing bimodality, in U.  S . congressional and state legislative elections. Third, this 
paper has demonstrated the value of  stochastic modeling for political science 
research-an  approach to formalizing democratic theory that is much closer to 
the data than more common methods. Indeed, since it uses the same theoretical 
form as the models most researchers presume to be driving their data, it is also 
more realistic and easier to apply directly in empirical analyses. At  the same 
time, stochastic modeling benefits from the same high degree of precision and 
rigor as other forms of formal theory. Future research is still needed to parame- 
terize partisan swing separately; to account for uncontested seats explicitly; to 
allow district election results to be correlated in an explicit time series model; 
and to derive a model that fits a wider range of electoral data. 
The issues addressed here have implications for the work of political scien- 
tists in many fields-from  classical, formal, and empirical democratic theory, to 
public law, to empirical analyses of specific election systems in both American 
and comparative politics, and even to political scientists as primary expert wit- 
nesses in court testimony (Grofman 1985b). Discovering how the American sys- 
tem of single-member, geographically contiguous districts influences democratic 
representation  and partisan 'bias must continue to play  a central role in  these 
endeavors. 
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APPENDIX A 
Fixed Incumbency and Partisan Swing Effects 
Given the time  1 probability density for VI in equation 4 and the functional relationship be- 
tween VI and V2 in equation 7, the mean voter preference distribution for V2 at time 2 may be derived 
in several ways. The most straightfanvard uses what is called the CDF  technique (Bain and Engle- REPRESENTATION  THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING  82  I 
hardt 1987, 140): first note that the cumulative version of the mean voter preference distribution may 
be derived as follows: 
1 -  V]  -I 
FvI(vl) -  WVI r VI)  =  fvI(vI)dvl  = [l + eA(T)  ]  (11) 
Then, we derive the cumulative density for V2: 
Fv2(v2)  -  Pr(VZ  G v2)  (12) 
= .{[I  + e-(?)']-'  < v2} 
{  [  (1;2v2)""]-'} 
= Pr  VI <  1 + ee@ - 
= Fvl[[l  + el(e)llly']  -I} 
=  +  e(A+lVy"(+)W']  -I 
The derivative of this cumulative distribution gives the time 2 probability distribution of mean voter 
preference across districts by taking the first derivative: 
dFv2(v2) 
fv2(v2) =  dvz  (13) 
= (~e~A+swlI[elA+.-~l  + (+"I-'  1 - v2 
x  v~lI-~w'(l  - v2)11+~w' 
and the corresponding time 2 seats-votes curve (calculated by the assumption in equation 5) is 
APPENDIX B 
Random Partisan Swing 
Begin with the assumption that partisan swing, E, is uniformly distributed: 
for  T -  t9 <  E <  T + 0, 0 > 0 
E -  U(E) = 
otherwise  (15) 
I incorporate this new assumption into the model in several steps. First, note that equation 9 is 
really a conditional distribution of  V2  on E (as well  as the other parameters). Then, write the joint 
distribution of  V2  and E as the product of  U(E) and fvz(v2)  -- fvz(v2  I E): Gary King 
Now integrate out e to leave the new time 2 mean voter preference distribution: 
fVi(v2) = /:=fvi(v2,  E)~E 
By the application of assumption 5,  the corresponding seats-votes curve is then: 
E(Si) = C  fVi(1 - ~2)dvZ 
Note that E does not appear directly in either the modified mean voter preference distribution or this 
corresponding seats-votes curve. However, the mean (7)  and the dispersion (0)  of the distribution of 
E are included. By this procedure, then, the model has one additional parameter. 
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